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Bangladesh seems unable to become 
tranquil. Persistently oscillating within a 
triangle of natural disasters, socio-economic 
catastrophes, and parliamentary deadlocks, 
the current situation is once again tapering 
towards a critical juncture. By turning the 
political discourse into violent street 
confrontations between the major actors, 
ignoring any kind of code of conduct, rules 
and procedures, the continuity of the 
country’s democracy is at stake again. Like 
a déjà-vu, the required democratic transfer 
of power and the electoral process that goes 
hand in hand with it, is leading the country 
‘as usual’ into a crucial political crisis. 
Historically, the crux of the matter is the 
issue of who organizes and supervises the 
national elections. Being highly polarized 
and lacking any minimum of trust, the two 
leading political camps – guided either by 
Begum Sheikh Hasina of the Awami League 
(AL) or Begum Khaleda Zia of the 
Bangladesh National Party (BNP) – are 
deeply suspicious of potential manipulation 
and undue influences regarding any 
electoral procedures and outcome. In order 
to address this problem, the idea of a 
constitutionally regulated partyless (i.e. 
impartial) caretaker government was put 
forward in the early 1990s. After having 
successfully organized a few elections, this 
institution was paralyzed by the endemic 
political antagonism that dominates all 
spheres of Bangladesh’s state and society. 
In consequence, the Bangladeshis had to 
experience a two-year military-backed 
caretaker government until elections were 
finally held in 2008. Having this in mind, the 
last ruling coalition (the so-called ‘Grand 
Alliance’) under AL guidance with its 
overwhelming majority (263 seats out 300) 
officially abolished the caretaker 
arrangement in June 2011. Instead, a new 
procedure for conducting the elections was 
set up, making the respective incumbent 
government more or less solely responsible 
for forming an interim administration until a 
newly, freely and fairly elected, government 
is in power. Taking the high degree of 
hostility and the unrestricted struggle 
between AL and BNP into account, it does 
not catch experts by surprise that the BNP 
and its allies are currently vehemently 
opposing the start of the electoral process 
under the new framework. These protests 
have in several instances resulted in bloody 
clashes. Here, the policy of the protesters is 
clearly unconstitutional and undemocratic, 
trying to paralyze the country in order to 
blackmail the interim government to step 
down. As an alternative, the BNP and its 
allies are demanding the re-establishment of 
the caretaker government under the ‘old 
procedures’. Obviously, this demand not 
only goes against the constitutional 
proceedings, but it entrenches the political 
 2 
  
stalemate further too. In sum, the evolving 
atmosphere over the last months and weeks 
does not seem to set the ideal climate for 
holding a constructive ‘all-party’ dialogue 
that can lead to free, fair and peaceful 
elections.  
 
Therefore, the departing AL government 
made a fait accompli by apparently ignoring 
all critics and opposition. On 25 November, 
Bangladesh Election Commission 
announced that the country will hold general 
election for the 10th National Parliament 
(Jatiya Sangsad) on 5 January 2014. This 
has to be understood as an unmistakable 
message towards all political forces to 
accept the formation of the acting 
government (cross-party interim 
government) on 18 November, and 
subsequent electoral procedures. It also 
means an attempt to bring the conflict about 
the demanded reintroduction of the 
(constitutionally) abolished institution of the 
non-party caretaker government to an end. 
In this context, the argument made by the 
opposition that only a non-party government 
can guarantee free and fair elections needs 
to be put in perspective. First, if there is no 
will by the leading political forces to stick to 
the agreed ‘rules of the game’, no kind of 
caretaker government or interim government 
will be able to perform its function. Second, 
the experience of the last caretaker 
government shows that this arrangement is 
also an ‘invitation’ of the armed forces to 
facilitate an influential role behind the 
scenes of national politics. Third, due to the 
deeply entrenched political polarisation of 
state and society, even non-partisan 
technocrats, who are supposed to be the 
members of the party-less caretaker 
government, will be confronted with the 
stigma of having an affiliation with a ‘certain’ 
political camp. It will therefore almost 
certainly provoke resistance. However, by 
assessing the actual situation, it looks quite 
unequivocal that the rationality of the cause 
is working in favour of the AL. To begin with, 
the formation of the acting interim 
government is consistent with the regulation 
of the constitution. The earlier constitutional 
amendment for this was legitimate due to 
AL’s majority in parliament. Furthermore, 
Sheikh Hasina is also entrusted with a moral 
argument, meaning that the AL cannot only 
claim that the party is acting constitutionally 
but also that Sheikh Hasina showed the 
‘good will’ by inviting Begum Khaleda Zia not 
only to take part in an interim’s government 
but also to form an ‘all-party national 
government’. In other words, the BNP was 
invited to create a ‘national consensus’ to 
carry out and oversee the upcoming polls for 
the next parliament. But the offer was 
rejected by the BNP and her 18-party 
alliance – a decision which put the country 
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at a crossroads again. In result, the political 
landscape of Bangladesh is characterised 
by fanatic political violence instead of 
constructive political debates. This very 
situation has provided militant extremists 
and Islamic fundamentalists enough room to 
manoeuvre to continue their attempts to 
transform Bangladesh into a fundamentalist 
state like the Taliban-ruled Islamic Emirate 
of Afghanistan of the 1990s.  
 
Therefore, there are many concerns 
regarding the deteriorating security and 
political situation in Bangladesh. 
Consequently, observers are wondering 
about the implications for the electoral 
process. This marks an occasion to shed 
some light on potential scenarios one must 
expect in the near political future: 
 
First, there is still the ‘theoretical opportunity’ 
of achieving a situation which could be 
called ‘best case scenario’ in the given 
context. This scenario is featured by free 
and fair elections which will work out 
relatively smoothly with a relatively low level 
of undue disturbances and violence. This 
should be made possible through a ‘last 
minute’ arrangement between the AL and 
BNP and the bulk of the oppositional forces 
to carry out the elections in order to avoid a 
further deterioration of the security situation. 
Such a ‘national consensus’ will most -likely 
be initiated through pressure of the 
international community. There are also no 
doubts that the army will play a major role in 
giving the ‘final incentive’ for the ‘recalcitrant 
civilians’ to find an agreement regarding the 
‘necessity’ of holding election. If such a 
scenario was to unfold, a few key events 
should take place. It is essential that the 
current oppositional forces give up their 
ongoing boycott of the interim government 
and the electoral process, especially to end 
the deconstructive policy of hartals (general 
strikes). Furthermore, the BNP must join the 
‘national consensus’-bloc. In other words, 
each significant faction of the BNP must join 
the agreement and distance itself from 
religious fundamentalism and other anti-
systemic notions. In the event the national 
consensus-bloc breaks up and one or more 
of the splinter groups resort to violence, the 
chances of seeing a smooth election 
process will be under acute threat. The split 
of minor factions are possible but will not 
change the trajectory of the ‘best case 
scenario’. 
 
Second, the already above indicated 
‘boycott scenario’ could actually appear in 
two different versions: a ‘full-boycott’ of the 
BNP or a ‘partly boycott’. A ‘full-boycott’ 
would be expressed by the whole BNP and 
all (most) of her candidates – a 
phenomenon which Bangladesh is 
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witnessing at the moment as reaction of the 
formation of the interim government and the 
January 5th as Election Day. One of the most 
important features of the ‘full-boycott’ is that 
there will be no break up of a (major) faction 
and no one (at least not a remarkable 
number) will run as an independent 
candidate. The ‘partly boycott’ is featured by 
the fact that the majority of the BNP 
candidates and their allies will not 
participate in the elections but a remarkable 
amount of candidates will run as 
independents. The spilt-up of a minor faction 
could be possible. However, a break-up of a 
major faction willing to take part in the 
elections would automatically create the 
moment for a ‘best case scenario’ as 
outlined above. However, in both versions 
(‘full-boycott’ and ‘partly-boycott’) 
Bangladesh will experience (relatively) free 
and fair elections (like in the ‘best case 
scenario’), which will be ensured by the 
country’s armed forces. It is important to 
note that the military will remain subservient 
to the civilians, understood as the elected 
representatives of the last government, and 
the incumbent interim government (also 
civilians and no technocrats). There will be 
two major reasons for this: First, the mind-
set of the military internalized that any direct 
military intervention into politics is 
unconstitutional, therefore the top echelon 
will refrain itself. Second, there is a 
significant improvement of the historically 
strained relationship between the army and 
the AL1. Here one could state, that Sheikh 
Hasina’s generosity regarding defence 
budget and the handling of the ‘munity case’ 
of the Bangladesh Rifles (now known as 
Bangladesh Border Guards) in February 
20092, gave her greater leverage over the 
armed forces. The fact that former military 
dictator Hossain Mohammad Ershad is part 
of the interim government might also help to 
facilitate the relations with the armed forces. 
 
However, in this scenario the whole electoral 
process (especially the election results) 
would lack legitimacy if a major segment of 
the political party spectrum and most likely a 
substantial part so the electorate will boycott 
the elections. Undoubtedly, the Islamist 
fundamentalists will make a huge effort to 
try to sabotage the polls and declare any 
result as illegitimate not only because they 
were banned but also because of the 
boycott of their allied BNP. Nevertheless, the 
current interim government and the 
subsequent new government can claim that 
                                                 
1
 The major reason therefore is the fact that Mujibur 
Rahman, the father of Sheikh Hasina got assassinated 
by a group of army officers.  
2
 On 25 and 26 February 2009 at Philkhana (Dhaka) a 
mutiny of the para-military Bangladesh Border Rifles 
(BRD) was staged. During the violent clashes, 
numerous commanding officers (including their 
families) of the armed forces deployed at the BDR 
were killed.  
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they tried to incorporate the opposition but 
that is was Zia who refused to participate. 
As such, Sheik Hasina holds a carte 
blanche to continue with the ongoing 
preparation of the elections. Therefore it 
looks like a cynical reflection of the 
unfortunate political situation that Khaleda 
Zia side-lines herself and former autocrat 
Ershad, who was forced to resign more than 
two decades ago by an alliance of the two 
arch rival Begums, is now part of the interim 
government and is jointly responsible to 
carry out the democratic transfer of power.  
 
Last but not least, there is the ‘worst case 
scenario’. This scenario will emerge if no 
agreement on holding peaceful elections is 
made between the AL and the BNP. 
Furthermore, militant resistance against the 
electoral process or the boycott will turn into 
an existential crisis (i.e. a national 
emergency) which will make it mandatory to 
call in the armed forces to ensure law and 
order and the basic functions of public 
service and state administration. In this 
context, there is an extraordinary threat that 
the deployment of the soldiers could happen 
in an extra-constitutional manner. In other 
words, the military will intervene in the 
political process. This could find its 
expression in two ways: First, the current 
interim government will extend its tenure 
beyond the constitutionally fixed 90 days 
with the blessing of the armed forces. 
Second, the armed forces could intervene to 
oust the acting interim government and 
install a caretaker government, most likely 
consisting of technocrats. The timeframe for 
holding elections would depend on the 
security situation and the cooperation of the 
AL and BNP as well as their respective 
allies. However, for obvious reasons such a 
government will not be in power for a long 
period of time. It will be limited by the 
following crucial determinants: The 
acceptance of civil society and the general 
public, and the goodwill of the international 
community. Here the bargaining chips 
(potential sanctions) will most likely be the 
withdrawal of peace keeping opportunities, 
aid programs/grants, and preferential trade 
agreements (especially with the European 
Union), and the economic performance of 
the extra-constitutional government. Any 
(further) worsening of the living conditions of 
the common people will provoke large scale 
protests. These determinants will function as 
push factors to bring such a ‘caretaker’ or 
‘interim’ government to an end. However, 
the concrete moment will be defined by 
additional pull factors. One of the pull factors 
would be the achievement of a ‘national 
consensus’ between the leading political 
parties. This could be either enforced by the 
military (even perhaps with the threat or 
realization of the so called minus-two-
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formula) or through a constructive dialogue 
to end the path of conflict. A second 
potential pull factor could be factionalism 
within the two or at least one of the two 
parties. More concretely, the break up of a 
major faction which is willing to join the 
electoral arena again would end the political 
stalemate, paving the way for elections.  
 
Last but not least, after elaborating on 
potential scenarios one must state that the 
confrontation over the electoral rules and 
procedures is not only about technicalities. 
It is also not only about the personal 
crunch between two political leaders and 
their followers. The conflict is about 
nothing less than the patterns of 
Bangladesh future political trajectory and 
the nature of the country’s normative 
foundation. In other words, the country is 
in the middle of an ideological battle: does 
it want to keep up the principles of 
democracy, secularism, and tolerance – 
which were the normative determinants of 
Bangladesh’s struggle for independence – 
or does it want to give in to radicalism, 
extremism, and intolerance imposed on 
Bangladesh people by Islamist 
fundamentalists represented by groupings 
like Jamaat-e-Islami or Hefazat-e-Islam? 
After more than four decades since the 
emergence of Bangladesh it is high time 
for the Bangladeshi people and its 
leadership to recall the reasons for the 
birth of their nation and make it finally 
happen – a secular democracy in a 
Muslim society. This can be achieved 
through free and fair elections only. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
